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INTRODUCTION1 
 
Across the globe, Richard Florida’s book The Rise of the Creative Class has captured the 
imaginations of economic developers, businessmen, and urban dwellers alike.  Florida’s 
central thesis is that the role of place has changed substantially as the U.S. economy 
continues its transition from traditional industry to high-tech and advanced services.  
Whereas people once followed jobs in traditional industries, jobs now follow highly 
mobile, creative people—people who increasingly base their location decisions not on job 
opportunities per se but on the urban amenities and cultural environment of a city.  The 
creative theory therefore purports that the economic prosperity of a city is based not on 
traditional economic development theories—such as human capital theory, economic 
base theory or cluster theory, for example—but on a city’s success in attracting and 
retaining key creative people (Florida, 2002).  
 
Florida’s idea has proven to be quite infectious: chasing the creative class has replaced 
cluster theory as today’s ubiquitous development strategy.  Cities across the globe have 
latched onto his creative roadmap, transforming old factories into swanky loft spaces, 
opening trendy coffee shops, and promoting local art galleries, all in an effort to please 
the fickle creative class.  His three T’s—talent, tolerance, and technology—are whipped 
off the tongues of city boosters, followed by quick recitations of where their city ranks on 
his Creativity, Bohemian, and Gay Indices.2  Creativity, it seems, is rescuing the de-
industrializing economy, and in the process is making cities—and not suburbs—the place 
to be. 
 
Yet with all the hype surrounding the creative class strategy, a potentially troubling side 
effect has emerged: inequality.  Florida himself acknowledges this (though with 
considerably less fanfare), and attributes it to an unfortunate, yet seemingly unavoidable 
“externality” of the rise of the creative class.  According to Florida and his collaborator 
Kevin Stolarick, a strong correlation exists between the presence of the creative class in 
metropolitan areas and income inequality.  Cities that rank high on the Creativity Index 
also rank high on the Inequality Index, a measure of occupational income premiums that 
Stolarick created (Florida 2002, 2005; Stolarick, 2003).  The new economic hope for 
cities, it seems, also has a dark side. 
 
According to Florida and Stolarick, this correlation reflects the fact that the creative class 
“outsources” much of the low-skill service activity, thereby generating a creative-
noncreative division of labor (Florida, 2002; Stolarick, 2003).  They are not alone in this 
observation, nor were they the first to write about it.  Scholars in the 1980s, such as 
Saskia Sassen, noted that the “critical mass” of high-income professionals in America’s 
                                                 
1
 I would like to acknowledge both Harvey Goldstein and Emil Malizia for providing data and involving 
me in the research that ultimately led to this paper, as well as Nichola Lowe for her suggestions and 
guidance. 
2
 Florida relies on many such indices and rankings in his work.  Talent, tolerance, and technology reflect 
the human capital and diversity of the local population, and the predominance of high-tech industry in the 
local economy, respectively; the Creative, Bohemian, and Gay Indices measures the representation of the 
creative class, artists, and gays in a metropolitan area (Florida, 2002).   
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global cities was leading to a rapid increase in the demand for low-end services—such as 
housekeepers, dog walkers and errand runners—that employed low-wage workers, often 
through the informal sector (Sassen-Koob, 1984; Sassen, 1990).    
 
Yet while Sassen points to the explosion of the low-wage, informal, and often immigrant 
labor force as an opportunity for “new alliances” among urban workers to improve their 
own position (Sassen-Koob, 1984), Florida’s solutions largely follow paternalistic 
strategies.  To combat inequality, Florida claims that the creative class must entice the 
noncreative classes—i.e., those in the working and service classes—to join them in a 
creative utopia. In the process, noncreatives can leave the shackles of menial, mind-
numbing labor behind in order to reach their full creative potential (Florida, 2005). 
 
How might the creative class facilitate class mobility?  As one example, Florida 
encourages creative management teams to transform their old-fashioned workplaces into 
“creative factories.”  Drawing on an earlier literature on High Performance Work 
Organizations, he proposes a firm-wide reorganization, especially in manufacturing 
industries, that would encourage greater worker participation in management and design 
processes, thereby giving workers at all levels an opportunity to develop and express their 
creative talents.  As a second example of this creative-led solution, Florida relays a 
personal experience where he encouraged his own housekeeper to expand her skill sets 
from cleaning and dusting to home decoration and interior design.  Through an informal 
mentoring process, he essentially enabled her to move into the creative class.  These are 
both clear examples of how, in his view, inequality is best addressed through creative 
class leadership (Florida, 2002, 2005; Maliszewski, 2004; Peck, 2005).   
 
Florida is quite clear as to what, in his opinion, will not work to reduce inequality: 
unions, and other social or political movements led by the noncreative classes. He 
essentially dismisses strategies that seek to strengthen the position of the noncreative 
classes relative to the creative class, or strategies that will cement noncreative categories 
of work (Florida, 2005; Peck, 2005).  Related to this, he dismisses what he sees as 
antiquated or “obsolete” solutions, such as a rise in the minimum wage or extension of 
living wage campaigns.  Instead, Florida seems to want the creative class to be all-
encompassing: the creative class may be the problem, but it can be the solution as well.   
 
But do these recommendations for creative-led actions accurately reflect the relationship 
between the creative class and inequality? Are new economy sources of inequality really 
that different from those exemplifying earlier economic periods? Is there sufficient 
evidence to support a dramatic shift in strategy formation that favors a Floridian 
approach, not just for urban redevelopment and renewal, but now for social mobility? 
Unfortunately, Florida’s own analysis—itself based on simple correlations and with little 
reference to the expansive literature on inequality—fails to provide us with full answers 
to these questions. As a result, Florida essentially avoids one of the most disconcerting 
aspects of his creative world, leaving the policymakers who have embraced his 
development ideas with few tangible options for reducing the rising inequality potentially 
left in their wake.  
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This paper is an attempt to bring the traditional theories and frameworks of inequality 
analysis to Florida’s work, through a literature review, statistical analysis, and in-depth 
policy analysis.  The questions to be answered in this paper are threefold.  First, is the 
creative class the sole predictor of inequality in metropolitan areas, or are alternative, 
well-studied factors and theories (such a skill-biased technical change, demand for 
college credentials, immigration, etc) better predictors of inequality? Second, are “old-
fashioned” institutions—such as the minimum wage or union protections—really useless 
in combating today’s inequality, or is there still a role for them to play in the creative 
economy?  And third, what policies can local metropolitan areas undertake to lessen the 
impacts of inequality?  
 
It should be stressed that this paper is not meant to be a wholesale dismissal of Florida’s 
work; rather, it is an attempt to determine what causes the variation in the inequality 
index, and which policies would be appropriate to incorporate into the creative class 
framework in order to limit inequality.  As evidenced by its popularity, creative 
development theories are here to stay—at least until the next popular development 
strategy comes along.  For those that advocate for the interests of lower- and middle-
income workers, dismissing the creative class strategies that are being followed in 
communities across the world will not help their cause.  Rather, solutions that can 
incorporate both creative and non-creative solutions are the most likely to be both 
politically and financially feasible.  
 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. Section II presents an in-depth review of 
Florida’s writings on inequality.  Section III includes a brief conceptual overview of 
inequality, as well as a review of the common casual factors that appear in inequality 
literature.  Section IV presents the methodology for the statistical analysis, Section V 
provides an overview of the data used in the statistical models, and Section VI presents 
the results from the models.  Using the results from the statistical analysis and applicable 
research to date, Section VII outlines potential policy solutions that could decrease the 
type of occupational wage inequality that exists alongside Florida’s classes, and Section 
VIII offers a conclusion. 
 
SECTION II 
 
Just one year after the release of The Rise of the Creative Class, Kevin Stolarick created 
the Inequality Index, which captures an occupational pay ratio between the creative class 
and the noncreative classes.  The creative class (what can perhaps be thought of as the 
“economic base” of Florida’s new creative economy) is comprised of occupations which 
require workers to “think” for a living; the noncreative classes—the service and working 
classes—are in turn comprised of occupations where workers are not required to think for 
a living.  Thus the latter groups are defined not as much by what they do, but by what 
they don’t do: they don’t think for a living, and are therefore not the driving force of the 
economy (Florida, 2002; see Appendix A for a list of the occupations in each of these 
classes).  
 
5 
In a piece released by Florida’s consulting arm, Stolarick announced that there is a 
relationship between being a creative city and having an unequal workforce, proclaiming 
that, “inequality goes hand and hand with being a cutting edge, technologically 
innovative, creative region” (Stolarick, 2003).  The higher the creative class percentage 
of the workforce, the more the creative class earns per year relative to the noncreative 
classes.   
 
Florida and Stolarick maintain that the strong relationship between the creative class and 
inequality is due to the hectic lifestyle of the creative class, which is comprised of busy 
people who do not have the time or the inclination to perform life’s daily tasks.  Instead, 
the creative class relies on an “army of ‘servants’” to cater to their everyday needs 
(Stolarick, 2003).  Both Stolarick and Florida reason that it is this “massive functional 
division of human labor [that produces] the bulk of our income divide” (Stolarick, 2003; 
Florida, 2003).     
 
As previously mentioned, this echoes earlier work by Saskia Sassen, who wrote that the 
economic transformation of the American economy away from manufacturing was 
producing a polarization of both occupations and wages in cities.  Highly paid 
professionals in America’s “global cities” drive demand for low-wage services; this new 
economic growth has replaced older growth, which was characterized by middle-income 
manufacturing jobs (Sassen-Koob, 1984).  It also touches on the long-established theory 
of the secondary labor market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Osterman, 1999).  Under this 
theory, the labor market is comprised of two groups: the first has high wages, benefits, 
and stable employment opportunities; the second has low wages, few benefits, and 
temporary or unstable employment opportunities.  In this framework, the creative class 
would be the first group, and the noncreatives would be the second group relegated to 
poor employment opportunities.  Yet both Sassen and Osterman relate these labor market 
woes not to the division of labor, but to the weak labor market institutions and worker 
alliances that govern the de-industrializing economy, driving them to the conclusions that 
these institutions and alliances need to be strengthened and broadened (Sassen-Koob, 
1984, Osterman, 1999).   
 
In contrast, and as was discussed in the introduction of this paper, Florida has made very 
few policy suggestions for fighting inequality.  Florida writes that to improve the 
economic circumstances of the noncreatives we must first improve our education system, 
and then focus on increasing both creative and non-profit opportunities.  Exactly how to 
do the former is left unanswered, since funding for educational programs remains a 
mystery.  Florida writes that raising taxes would be a “tough sell” to the creative class, 
since they need their money to send their children to private schools, and since the 
libertarian creative class is distasteful to government policies or intervention (Florida, 
2002, 2003; Maliszewski, 2004; Peck, 2005).  As for increasing creative and non-profit 
jobs, this undoubtedly points to the recommendations overviewed in the introduction: 
having the creative class lead the noncreatives to creative factory work via the formation 
of High Performance Work Organizations, and to creative services, as with his 
housekeeper-turned-interior designer example.   
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At first glance, these policies seem similar to calls for the “upskilling” or “upgrading” of 
the workforce; factory workers are given the opportunity to move up the occupational 
ladder by becoming active members of a firm’s extended “management” team, or in the 
case of housekeeping, develop new skills in high-end services in interior design.  
Furthermore, by giving workers who are most familiar with the means of production a 
voice, these sectors of the economy could become more dynamic and productive.  Yet 
there is nothing in his suggestions that ensures that these productivity increases will 
translate into higher wages for the old noncreative classes, a common criticism of both 
High Performance Work Organizations and more recent productivity trends in the general 
economy (Shaiken, 2003; Bailey and Bernhardt, 1997; Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005).  
Thus while Florida has suggestions for how these workers could be more creative, he has 
few suggestions as to how this new classification of their occupation will actually 
translate into higher wages. 
 
It is therefore surprising that Florida rejects traditional ways of helping low-income 
workers move up the economic ladder towards higher wages and potentially creative 
jobs, such as unions, living wage campaigns and a rising minimum wage, which could 
help ensure that the productivity gains in the creative economy are in fact translated into 
higher earnings.  While Florida says that the creatives must find ways to “invent a new 
form of collective action,” he proposes no such thing for the noncreatives (Florida, 2002).  
Paul Maliszewski recounts a revealing discussion on CSPAN, in which Florida remarked 
that unions “are no longer relevant,” and that we should “get beyond all these 
bureaucratic, large-scale, industrial institutions” (Maliszewski, 2004). This is perhaps 
because Florida seems more concerned with the fact that the noncreatives aren’t creative, 
rather than the fact that the noncreatives are earning wages either at or below the poverty 
line.  Florida at times bemoans the very existence of the noncreative classes, calling it a 
“great waste of creative capital” (Florida, 2005).  Unfortunately, Florida never truly 
reconciles this thought with the fact that the creative class will continue to need an “army 
of ‘servants,’” who they probably won’t want to pay higher wages to, even if they do 
become “creative” through the creative mentoring processes suggested by Florida.  
  
In a recent article that appeared in USA Today, Florida criticized Bush’s proposal to 
emphasize job growth in mathematics and science, pointing out that these high-wage, 
high-skill jobs would not be an outlet for those who had lost their middle-income 
manufacturing jobs.  Instead, Florida instructed the President to “[get] beyond the 
conventional wisdom that all service jobs are condemned to low pay and poor working 
conditions…” and instead learn from high-wage, high-benefit companies like Whole 
Foods and Best Buy (Florida, 2006).  This is, in part, true: math and science funding 
won’t directly help low-wage workers. But yet again, Florida fails to fully explain how a 
more creative curriculum will result in service companies agreeing to pay higher wages 
and benefits. 
 
Besides mysteriously funded government programs and calls to behave like Whole 
Foods, Florida lays the fate of the noncreatives at the feet of the creative class, as seen 
from his creative mentoring suggestions.  The creative class, he writes, should “…[offer] 
those in the other classes a tangible vision of ways to improve their own positions, either 
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by becoming part of the Creative Economy or coexisting with it… (Florida, 2002).  In 
this, Florida is proposing what geographer Jamie Peck describes as the “creative trickle 
down” (Peck, 2005).  Rather than being helped through strong labor market institutions, 
or compensated for being the unfortunate but necessary army supporting the creative 
class, the noncreatives are told to pull themselves up on their own creative bootstraps.  As 
with most bootstrapping, there is no overarching policy framework to help the 
noncreatives along the way—short of being told to follow the path blazed by the creatives 
that have come before them.   
 
On a basic level, the reasoning that Florida adopts—that the division between the 
creatives and the noncreatives creates inequality—makes sense.  After all, we would 
expect people who are paid to “think” for a living to earn more than people who are not.   
But can this—the creative-noncreative division of labor—really be the only causal factor 
of today’s inequality? In his work, Osterman points towards the decline of workplace 
norms, organized labor, and an increasingly volatile economy (Osterman, 1999).  Sassen 
ultimately focuses on the relationship between the restructured economy and the 
explosion of the informal sector (Sassen-Koob, 1984; Sassen, 1990).  And unlike 
Florida—who approaches the dark side of his creative world rather flippantly, referring to 
inequality as an unfortunate “externality”—both consider the bifurcation of the labor 
market to be a critical issue, reflecting deeper problems in the labor market and economy.  
 
Policies aimed at improving the economic wellbeing of less-skilled workers must be 
developed, and in today’s economy that means developing policies around the service 
sector.  Unfortunately for Florida, Wal-Mart—the fastest growing retailer—is unlikely to 
follow the lead set by creative employer Whole Foods and offer substantially higher 
wages and benefits. When faced with this challenge, Florida ultimately makes a valid 
point: workers in low-end services are unlikely to be helped by increased political 
attention towards math and science—and for that matter, as I argue below, from growing 
political support for worker retraining programs.  If anything, this realization reinforces 
the need for strong labor market institutions and proactive policies that go beyond simply 
calling for paternalistic action from the creative class and vague calls for a diffusion of 
the Whole Foods model.  
 
In sum, Florida’s assertion that inequality springs simply from a human division of labor 
essentially concludes that inequality is an unavoidable side-effect, and misses the larger 
points of why the inequality exists, why the pay ratio increases as the creative class 
increases, and why the creative-noncreative earnings gap varies from one region to 
another.  It also misses the fundamental question of what can be done about it; since he 
misses the deeper causes of inequality, his policy solutions are ultimately misguided.  
Luckily for Florida, labor economists and sociologists have suggested a myriad of 
explanations that could help answer the question of what causes inequality, ultimately 
paving the path towards policies that could combat inequality. 
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SECTION III 
 
Before moving onto the alternative factors that labor analysts have put forth as the causes 
of inequality, it is important to consider three questions central to inequality: what is it, 
why should we care about it, and what lessons can we learn from a brief look at historical 
inequality?  While these may seem like fairly innocuous questions, each is critical to our 
approach to understanding both the problem of inequality and the possible policy 
solutions.   
 
Inequality: What is it?  
 
There are many ways to approach the issue of economic inequality.  The most common 
way is to look at income or wage inequality.3  Even here there are arguments as to what 
the most critical components of inequality are: the income of the wealthy versus the 
income of the poor, the declining position of the middle class, the plight of extreme poor 
in the face of such a wealthy nation, or the recent rise of the ultra-rich—those above the 
99th, if not the 99.9th, percentile in the earnings distribution (Krueger, 2002).  Ultimately, 
each shares a common thread: the study of the distribution of earnings across the gamut 
of America’s workers, a distribution that is increasingly unequal.4   
 
Why Should We Care?  
 
The notion that inequality is a problem is not shared by all: George Mason University 
economist Russell Roberts, for example, claims that since the average poor person in 
America has a washing machine, a car, and access to health care, inequality is an over-
hyped problem.  He also remarks that since there is still an opportunity for upward social 
and economic mobility, the problem of inequality is vastly overstated (Boushey and 
Roberts, 2006).  Unfortunately, such anecdotal arguments miss the larger point: the 
wages of the lowest-income Americans have declined in recent years. In contrast, the 
wages of the 99.9th percentile have exploded, all while the middle-class is increasingly 
being pushed towards the bottom (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005; Piketty and Saez, 
2003).  
 
The strongest arguments calling for a reduction in inequality tend to center around social 
and economic justice, yet also pull from religious and philosophical traditions of the need 
to care for all members of a society.5  These arguments tend to reflect the notion that 
modern, wealthy, democratic societies should not have a permanent underclass, notions 
backed up by millennia of philosophic and religious thought.     
 
Yet there are also economic arguments to be made for reducing inequality. As economist 
Heather Boushey states, inequality—and in particular the declining wages of those at the 
                                                 
3
 A third, wealth inequality, will not be considered in this paper. 
4
 For a brief summary of the most common statistical ways to measure inequality, see Levy and Murnane 
(1992). 
5
 For a brief yet thoughtful discussion of each of these, see Krueger (2002). 
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bottom end of the income distribution—means that consumption for lower- and middle-
income Americans may be put under pressure and ultimately decline.  Americans are 
currently spending money they don’t have (going into debt, in other words), a trend that 
cannot continue to support the economy forever.  Given that final goods consumption is a 
key economic driver for this country, rising inequality could pose a serious problem for 
long-term economic stability (Boushey and Roberts, 2006). 
 
Finally, there are political and security concerns associated with inequality.  Alan 
Krueger suggests that the influence of an increasingly small, wealthy minority in politics, 
for example, can lead to very un-democratic outcomes (Krueger, 2002).  At an extreme, a 
look at the political and social consequences of vastly unequal societies (including 
several countries in the Middle East and Africa, as well as extremely poor urban pockets 
in Europe, illustrated by the recent riots in Paris, France), provides a startling picture of 
the devastation that can occur when huge swaths of the population are underemployed 
and poor.  Alan Greenspan put this eloquently, when he said in 2005,  
 
"In a democratic society, a stark bifurcation of wealth and income 
trends among large segments of the population can fuel resentment and 
political polarization. These social developments can lead to political 
clashes and misguided economic policies that work to the detriment of 
the economy and society as a whole" (Quoted in Boushey and Russell, 
2006). 
 
Thus though the reasons we should care about inequality reach back to the foundations of 
society in religion and philosophy, they also have very real repercussions for the 
sustainability of our economy and stability of our society—and should therefore not be 
brushed aside.   
 
Are There Lessons from our Past? 
 
Examining past eras of inequality—and more importantly, the times and events that 
occurred when inequality reversed course—can add insight into the causes of inequality, 
and the possible policy solutions that could help alleviate inequality.  Formal studies of 
income inequality typically focus on the time period between 1913 (the start of the 
federal income tax) and the present.  These studies suggest two watersheds: World War II 
and the early 1970s.  Each of these marked a reversal in inequality: inequality declined 
during and after World War II, and increased dramatically after the early 1970s.6  
 
The post-War decrease in inequality appears to be unique in American history, due to its 
severity and length.  From the onset of World War II to the early 1970s, the share of 
income earned by the top percentiles of the earnings distribution declined substantially 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003).  This is due in part to the fact that all workers—throughout the 
entire wage distributions—seemed to be sharing in the post-war gains in real wages 
(Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Ryscavage, 1999). 
                                                 
6
 For more in depth analysis of historical inequality, see Goldin and Margo (1992), Levy and Murnane 
(1992), Piketty and Saez (2003), and Ryscavage (1999). 
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Economists seem to have largely agreed on four major mid-century trends that explain 
the startling pattern of equalization throughout the post-War period.  First, the steep 
increase in demand for semi-skilled labor in the wartime factories (relative to skilled, 
craft labor) decreased the skill premium, thereby decreasing inequality.  Second, the 
National War Labor Board set wages throughout the war in occupational brackets, and 
had to approve wage increases, all of which led to the compression of wages, particularly 
in the upper portion of the wage distribution.  Third, and in terms of the long-term effects 
of the wartime compression, the steep increase in factory jobs and further 
industrialization occurred when unionization levels were at their highest, assuring 
American workers of high-paying, low-skill jobs. Fourth, and harder to quantify, the 
cultural and corporate norms that the War Board instilled may have led to long-term 
equalization in pay (Goldin and Margo, 1992; Piketty and Saez, 2003; Osterman, 1999).  
These four factors assured that the post-War, “Fordist” period in the American economy 
was one of prosperity across the entire income distribution. 
 
What is perhaps most striking about these factors is how much they were driven by both 
governmental and institutional factors. Unionization, the War Board, and cultural norms 
are all outside the easily quantifiable factors that most modern economists include in their 
econometric models, and it is these econometric models that dominate the debate about 
the causes and potential policy solutions to inequality.  Thus, this quick look at the post-
war equality suggests that the role of government and labor institutions in limiting 
inequality should not be overlooked, and also suggests that while econometric models 
may be useful, qualitative, as well as intangible factors, like norms, should not be 
overlooked.  
 
By 1973, however, the long-lasting increases in income across the distribution had ended.  
Income declined at the bottom end of the distribution, and began to rise at the top—the 
income controlled by the very top of the income distribution is fast approaching levels 
not seen since the Great Depression, clearly ending the “golden era” of equality (Goldin 
and Margo, 1992; Piketty and Saez, 2003).  Yet while there is a general consensus around 
the factors that led to the Great Compression of income during and after World War II, 
economists rally around few such points when it comes to the widening of inequality that 
has occurred over the past thirty years.  Six factors emerge from the literature as being 
influential and potential causal factors: the supply of educated workers and immigrants; 
changes in the demand for workers due to technical change and international competition; 
and changing institutional structures such as unionization and the minimum wage.  Yet 
the extent to which each of these has influenced both skilled and unskilled workers 
(rough equivalents to Florida’s creative and noncreative workers) remains unanswered.7  
Each of these six factors will be briefly discussed in the literature review that follows. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Florida’s Inequality Index—which will be further explored in Section V and in Appendix B—is 
essentially a ratio of income across occupational lines (creative to noncreatives).   
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Supply of Skilled Workers due to Increasing College Education 
 
Labor analysts have attributed part of the increase in income inequality to a rising pay 
gap between educated and less-educated (or skilled and less-skilled) workers.  This has 
led many economists to suggest that there is a shortage of educated workers or what is 
often referred to as a “skills mismatch” in the economy.  This hypothesis, however, is not 
shared by all. 
 
Faced with the evidence of the rising wages of educated workers with respect to less-
educated workers, a simple supply and demand model of wages would suggest that the 
supply of educated workers has been falling over time (holding demand constant). In fact, 
the percentage of college graduates has quadrupled since 1940.  In other words, both the 
supply of educated workers and their wages have increased.   
 
How is this possible? Labor analysts point to a larger shift in demand for educated 
workers, suggesting that the supply of educated workers has not been the dominant force 
in explaining the post-1970s increase in the educational wage premium.  In other words, 
an explosive increase in demand for educated workers has continued to outpace their 
ever-increasing supply (Murphy and Welch, 1993; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and 
Autor, 1998; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Deere, 2001).8  Thus the argument that inequality 
is caused by a shortage of educated workers has little merit. 
 
Some economists have argued that the large supply of college-educated workers may 
have led to other causal factors of inequality.  Daron Acemoglu, for example, suggests 
that the rapid increase in college graduates may have induced new forms of technology or 
managements that are biased towards educated workers, making the economy less 
favorable to less-skilled workers (Acemoglu 2001).  These theories would suggest that 
having a large portion of college-educated workers would actually increase inequality, 
rather than decrease it.   
 
Supply of Less-Skilled Workers due to Immigration   
 
A second focus of study for labor analysts is the role of immigrant labor on inequality. 
While clearly not without controversy, the argument is that a rise in immigration 
increases in the supply of less-educated and less-skilled Americans, since, on average, 
they have fewer years of schooling than native-born Americans (Borjas, Freeman, and 
Katz 1997; Reed 2001).9  Therefore, one may expect wages for less-skilled workers to be 
                                                 
8
 This is not to say that the role of supply is not important.  Supply has been dominant in at least one 
historical period.  The supply of baby-boom college graduates jumped dramatically in the 1970s, in part 
induced by Vietnam-era college draft deferments.  This glut of college graduates may have been enough to 
keep down the wages of skilled workers in the early 1970s, and may also have masked the beginnings of 
increasing demand for educated workers (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1998; Levy and 
Murnane, 1992).   
9
 Immigrant education levels are bimodal: immigrants are more likely to have less than nine years of 
schooling than native-born Americans, but are also more likely to have higher levels of education (Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz, 1997).  Since the former far outweighs the latter, immigrants are generally—and 
perhaps too simplistically—classified as “less-skilled” or “less-educated.” 
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driven down by an ever-increasing supply of less-skilled, immigrant workers.  At the 
same time, this larger pool of less-skilled workers is expected to drive up the wages of 
skilled workers in the area; as the population grows due to the influx of immigrants, the 
demand for skilled services—in fields such as education and medicine, for example—will 
also rise.  Without a corresponding supply increase in skilled labor, the wages in skilled 
occupations will increase.  In theory, then, the wage gap between less-skilled and skilled 
workers could increase due to two related events: the increase in supply of less-skilled 
labor, and in the increase in demand for skilled labor.  In the short term, therefore, 
immigration should be associated with an increased wage premium, leading to greater 
inequality (Reed 2001).   
 
However, theory also predicts that over the long term: production should move to the 
places where immigration is highest to take advantage of the low wages; unskilled 
workers (either native or immigrant) should out-migrate to get higher wages; and skilled 
workers should in-migrate to take advantage of higher wages.  Thus in the long run, 
theory suggests that the wage premium should remain unchanged (Reed, 2001). 
 
Yet the role of immigration in statistical studies has had conflicting results, largely 
depending on the geographic area that is studied.  Most national studies suggest that 
immigration has been a relevant, though minor factor, and one that really only has a 
detrimental effect on the wages of those with the lowest levels of education such as those 
with less than a high school degree (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997; Cline, 2001).  
Several regional studies, on the other hand, have found much larger negative impacts of 
immigration.  Richard Topel, for example, found that immigration—particularly in the 
western region of the US—had considerable detrimental impacts on inequality (Topel 
1994).  In her regional study, Deborah Reed found that immigrants could account for 
between one-quarter to one-half of the regional variation in inequality (Reed, 2001).  
Case study evidence, such as that compiled by Christian Zlolniski in Silicon Valley, 
suggests that the working arrangements facilitated by immigration—such as the informal 
sector, which often pays below the minimum wages—could be the reason for these 
regional effects (Zlolniski, 1994; Sassen, 1984).   
 
Demand Changes due to Technological Change 
 
As previously discussed, income inequality may be on the rise because the demand for 
more educated workers has outstripped supply.  The most plausible theoretical 
explanation put forward by labor analysts relates to skill-biased technical change. Since 
we assume that the two groups in our model (skilled/educated/creative and less-
skilled/less-educated/noncreative) are not perfect substitutes for each other, changes in 
technology can be assumed to have differing impacts.  Technical changes (in particular 
those associated with computerization and other innovative production technologies) 
have tended to increase the demand for educated workers relative to less-educated 
workers (Katz and Autor, 1998; Bound and Johnson, 1992).  
 
New technologies complement the existing skill sets of educated workers, giving 
educated workers a comparative advantage over less-educated workers in occupations 
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utilizing new technologies.  While the marginal product of skilled workers increases with 
the utilization of new technologies, the marginal product of unskilled workers decreases 
with the utilization of new technologies.  This in turn decreases the demand for unskilled 
labor, and increases the demand for skilled labor.  Recent technological innovation may 
therefore have contributed to increasing wage inequality by driving down the wages of 
less-skilled labor and increasing the wages of skilled labor (Krussel et al, 2000; Autor 
and Katz, 1998).   
 
As discussed in a previous section, there is an additional hypothesis that posits that it is 
the very increase in the supply of skilled workers that has exacerbated the wage gap.  
Acemoglu writes that firms develop or implement new technologies only when it is 
profitable to do so; without a sufficient supply of skilled workers to use the technologies, 
or when technology is expensive, it is not profitable to do so.  Under this lens, the post-
war decrease in the cost of technology and the dramatic increase in skilled workers led to 
circumstances in which it has been profitable for firms to upgrade their technologies, 
leading them to further develop skill-biased technology (Acemoglu, 2001).   
 
Demand Changes due to International Trade 
 
The changing value of the dollar in the 1980s and the resulting decrease in demand for 
US-manufactured goods, relative to imports, has also been put forward as a contributing 
factor to the decline in relative demand for less-skilled workers (particularly in the 
manufacturing sector) (Levy and Murnane, 1992).  The extent to which international 
competition (or globalization) has influenced inequality, however, has probably been the 
most hotly debated aspect of the inequality puzzle.  Arguments concerning the extent of 
trade’s role in inequality largely center around the statistical methods used in the analysis.   
 
Many researches conclude that trade has not been a major factor in inequality, 
particularly when compared to skill-biased technological change or even institutional 
factors (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997 or Cline, 2001, for example).  In general, the 
growth of the economy over the long-term that trade allows (due to cheaper imported 
goods from comparative advantage) is expected to offset any short-term dislocation 
problems that may be associated with increased international competition.  Distributional 
changes in income (between skilled and unskilled labor, for example) are not a direct 
result of the trade, but rather of the result of changes in demand between sectors 
(Richardson, 1995).   
 
UK-economist Adrian Wood, however, has argued that the majority of the studies 
examining international trade have underestimated domestic effects due to 
methodological flaws, and have therefore underestimated their impact on widening 
inequality.  He dissents from the majority-held opinion that trade does not lead to a 
significant amount of inequality, and instead finds that trade can account for a substantial 
amount of inequality (Wood, 1995).  Sassen, too, writes that it is this global restructuring 
of the economy and subsequent off-shoring of stable, middle-income manufacturing jobs 
that has led to the bifurcation of the urban labor market between low-wage service jobs 
and high-wage professional service jobs (Sassen-Koob, 1984; Sassen, 1990).  Finally, 
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even though he agrees with the majority-held opinion that trade is not a leading cause of 
inequality, J. David Richardson points out that many econometric models (which 
typically use a general equilibrium model) often do not take into account the “subtle and 
chronic” transitional effects of the inter-regional or inter-sectoral immobility of labor 
(Richardson, 1995); these are potentially significant factor in regional studies, 
particularly in sectorally less-diverse regions or where worker skills are not transferable 
(automobile workers in Detroit, for example). 
 
Changes in Labor Market Institutions 
 
The decline of unionization among low-skilled American workers may also be a factor in 
the widening inequality.  The “Great Compression” between 1940 and 1973 occurred 
when the labor movement was at its strongest, both in size and clout.  In 1945, 35 percent 
of the US workforce was unionized, an all-time high; by 1960 that number had fallen to 
29 percent, fell again to 25 percent by 1970 (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).  The 1980s 
brought about the largest decreases in unionization: union representation fell to 16 
percent by 1989, and now rests around 12 percent.  
 
Most researchers have pointed to unionization as a contributing factor to increasing 
inequality, though the extent of its influence remains debated.  Most claim that 
deunionization explains only a small portion of the increase in inequality; as with trade, 
deunionization is considered small when compared to skill-biased technical change 
(Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Freeman, 1993; Cline, 2001).  Others, however, 
point to unions as being much more important, especially when they focus on the role of 
unions for the very low-skilled or very low-educated.  David Card writes that 
deunionization can account for fifteen to twenty percent of the increase in male 
inequality, while Nicole Fortin and Thomas Lemieux find that the 1980s deunionization 
in the US can explain a full thirty percent of the increase in wage inequality (Card, 2001; 
Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).10 
 
As with unionization, the real minimum wage has also declined over the same period that 
the educational/skilled wage gap has increased, and has been theorized to be a causal 
factor.  Relative to technological change and declining unionization, however, most 
econometric models suggest that the falling real minimum wage has not been a strong 
contributor to rising inequality (Horrigan and Mincy, 1993; Cline, 2001).  This is in part a 
result of the fact that while many Americans have low earnings, few actually earn the 
minimum wage (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman, 1990).  William Cline, for example, 
has estimated that the declining real minimum wage accounts for only about five percent 
of the increase in the skills wage premium, compared to fifteen percent from declining 
unionization (Cline, 2001).11  However, Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux find that the 
                                                 
10
 Both authors note that deunionization has little effect on earnings inequality for women, who tend to be 
less unionized than men. 
11
 Both Horrigan and Mincy (1993) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997) find that an increase in the minimum 
wage would have a much larger impact on reducing female inequality, since women are more likely to earn 
the minimum wage than men. 
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declining minimum wage has had a substantial effect on inequality (Dinardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1996) 
 
Summary of Factors  
 
The literature presents compelling reasons for the increase in wage inequality.  The 
increase in the share of college-educated adults may have induced new business forms or 
technologies more amenable to educated workers, and immigration has had local effects 
on inequality by increasing less-skilled, less-educated workers willing to work for 
substantially lower wages or in informal sectors.  The demand for workers has shifted 
from less-educated, less-skilled workers to educated, skilled workers, which could be 
driven by technical change and/or international trade.  Finally, declining unionization 
rates have lowered worker bargaining power, and the falling real minimum has failed to 
ensure that the lowest-paid Americans continue to see their incomes rise relative to the 
highest-paid workers.   
 
The literature also provides a framework to test Florida’s hypothesis: that the creative 
class is the largest factor explaining inequality in a metropolitan area, and that other 
factor put forth by economists can explain inequality in the creative economy.   
 
SECTION IV: METHODS 
 
Three multivariate models are used in this statistical analysis.  The fist of the three 
models includes inequality variables from the counter-arguments to Florida (those 
reviewed in the previous section, that is) and control variables.  The second model 
includes Florida’s predictors and the control variables.12  The third model combines the 
counter-argument variables, Florida’s variables, and the control variables.  Through 
analysis of individual variables in each of the three models and model comparison tests, 
this structure should allow us to determine whether Florida’s theories or the economic 
counter-arguments—or some combination of the two—best predict inequality in a region. 
 
The models include observations for 264 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the 
United States.13 The independent variables in the models span years from 1986 to 2003, 
and the dependent variable for wage inequality is from 2004.  Though the majority of the 
independent variables were measured in years prior to the dependent variable, the models 
remain cross-sectional and cannot rigorously test time order.  Causal models could be 
specified and tested in further research with more comprehensive time series data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 I would like to thank both Richard Florida and Kevin Stolarnick for providing their data. 
13
 The metropolitan statistical areas follow 1999 guidelines, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) and New England consolidated metropolitan areas 
(NECMAs) are considered equivalent to metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  Of the 318 total MSAs, 
PMSAs, and NECMAs, two were excluded (Honolulu, Hawaii and Anchorage, Alaska) due to their 
economic and geographical isolation.  Only 264 were used in the regressions due to missing values.  
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SECTION V: DATA 
 
The dependent variable used in the models is Stolarick’s inequality index.  The index is a 
ratio of the average income of the creative class to the average income of the noncreative 
classes in a metropolitan area, and therefore measures an occupational based inequality 
between the classes.  Unfortunately, since the inequality index is derived from the 
earnings averages of each of the occupational classes, it cannot capture detailed 
inequality across the entire earnings distribution in a metropolitan area, nor can it capture 
inequality within Florida’s classes.  Yet examining inequality through the lens of 
Florida’s inequality index is useful, since policymakers instituting Florida’s creative class 
strategies may think of their labor market as being comprised of creative and noncreative 
workers.  Therefore, the results of these models will be directly compatible with the 
strategies that are being instituted locally.14  
 
The independent variables in the models are driven both by Florida’s views on the causes 
of inequality, and the economic counter-arguments to Florida’s views.  Variables 
representing education, immigration, international trade, skill-biased technical change, 
de-unionization, and the declining minimum wage are all represented.  Florida’s theory – 
that the presence of the creative class is the sole cause of inequality – is also represented 
in the model.   
 
The percentage of the adult population with a college education (coll90) in a metropolitan 
area represents the supply of college-educated workers.  Though original inequality 
theories hypothesized that this variable would have a negative coefficient, contemporary 
research suggests that the supply of college-educated adults will have a positive 
coefficient (Acemoglu 2001).   
 
A variable for foreign-born residents in an MSA (foreignborn) represents the immigration 
hypothesis, and is expected to have a positive coefficient.  Since manufacturing is the 
sector most likely to suffer from international trade, a variable representing the change in 
manufacturing earnings in an MSA between 1986 and 1997 (mfge8697pc) represents the 
international trade hypothesis.  This variable is expected to have a negative coefficient, 
since MSAs that have seen the largest decline in manufacturing are expected to have high 
levels of inequality.   
 
Unfortunately, skill-biased technical change is much harder to quantify, particularly at 
the MSA level.  Florida’s TechPole variable (techpole90), which measures high-tech 
industrial output, is a good indicator of skill-biased technical change at the MSA level, 
since high-tech industries are likely to be skill-biased.  TechPole is expected to have a 
positive coefficient.  
 
Union representation numbers are not readily available at the MSA level, so state union 
representation levels (unionrep90) have been used to represent the de-unionization 
hypothesis.  While this is not a perfect representation of the metropolitan area itself, the 
                                                 
14
 The occupations that define Florida’s classes, as well as a more detailed explanation of the calculation of 
the index, can be found in Appendices A and B. 
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inclusion of state-level data captures both statewide labor laws (such as those governing 
worker rights and whether the MSA is in a right-to-work state), as well as the “threat-
effect” of unionization that may or may not be felt by companies in an MSA.15  State 
minimum wages (mw) have been included to represent the declining minimum wage 
hypothesis, since some states may have combated the declining minimum wage by the 
instigation of their own, higher wage.   Both unionization and minimum wage variables 
are expected to have negative coefficients, since they raise the wages of the lowest-
skilled workers relative to the highest-skilled workers. 
 
Florida’s Creative Class variable represents the dominance of creative occupations in an 
MSA, and has been included to reflect Florida’s hypothesis.  The Creative Class (cc98) is 
expected to have a positive coefficient.  The Bohemian Index (bohoidx90) has been 
included as a control for the creative class, since the bohemian index should capture the 
majority of the low-wage creative occupations.  The bohemian index is also expected to 
have a positive coefficient.   
 
Two controls have been included in the models.  The population of the MSA in 1990 
(pop90) has been included to control for possible population and agglomeration effects, 
and a variable representing the number of MSAs within 30 miles of the target MSA 
(nmsa30) has been included to control for possible spillover effects.  
 
For more in-depth descriptions of the variables and their source information, see 
Appendix B.  Descriptive statistics and a summary of the hypothesized directions of the 
variables are presented in Appendix C. 
 
SECTION VI: RESULTS 
 
The results from each of the three models are presented in Tables 1-3.  Though the 
discussion that follows will focus on each of the three models, the conclusion is that 
Florida’s creative class is not the only predictor of regional inequality, nor is it the largest 
predictor of inequality—instead, a variety of factors appear to be influential in 
determining regional inequality.  
 
Full results from the first model, containing only economic counter-argument and control 
variables, appear in Table 1.  The model is significant and explains over half of the 
variation of the dependent variables, as evidenced by the F-value of 44.02, and adjusted 
R2 of 0.57.  The model has a skewness of 0.007 and kurtosis of 3.37.  Using these values 
in a Jarque-Bera test does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis, meaning the model 
has a normal distribution and that the results from the model are robust.       
                                                 
15
 Two schools of thought exist on the effects of unionization.  The “threat-effect” school suggests that 
higher levels of unionization will make non-unionized firms to act like unionized firms, in order to hold off 
unionization.  The “crowding” school suggests that unionized firms limit employment, leading to a higher 
supply of workers for non-unionized firms to pull from.  The threat-effect leads to higher wages in non-
unionized firms, but the crowding effect leads to lower wages in non-unionized firms.  Though 
considerable debate remains, David Neumark and Michael Wachter suggest that the threat effect holds in 
metropolitan areas due to large, dense, and highly-visible unions (Neumark and Wachter, 1995).   
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With the exception of the control variable for spillover effects (nmsa30), all of the 
variables were significant.  All of the confidence intervals for the significant variables 
were consistent with the hypothesized sign, meaning that we are 95 percent confident that 
the coefficients of the variables will have their hypothesized sign if we had drawn 
different samples from the population of MSAs.   
 
The standardized coefficient associated with college-educated adults (coll90) is the 
largest in the model at 0.54, making the presence of college-educated adults the most 
important determinant of regional inequality.16  The positive coefficient presents further 
evidence to the hypothesis that there is not a shortage of college-educated adults.  Instead, 
the positive coefficient suggests that their presence may allow for business methods or 
technologies that are biased in favor of educated or skilled workers, as Acemoglu 
suggests (Acemoglu, 2001).  While the latter point could suggest that college-educated 
adults and the variable for skill-biased technical change are measuring the same concept, 
an F-test preformed on the two variables—with the null hypothesis that the effects of the 
two variables are one and the same—is soundly rejected with a p-value of 0.000.   
 
 
Immigration, as represented by the variable foreignborn, has a positive coefficient, as 
expected. Yet the standardized coefficient of 0.22 makes immigration the second largest 
predictor of inequality. This finding adds credence to the theory that immigration 
significantly increases the supply of less-skilled labor, and is consistent with regional 
models that find that high levels of immigration are associated with higher levels of 
inequality (Reed, 2001, Topel, 1994).  
  
Though the standardized coefficients for the two institutional variables, -0.17 for the 
minimum wage (mw) and -0.16 for unionization (unionRrp90), pale in comparison to 
those associated with college education and immigration, they both have larger effects 
                                                 
16
 Standardized coefficients essentially remove the effect of each variable’s scale, allowing us to directly 
compare the importance of a variable to the remaining variables in a model.  
Variables Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficient
VIF
coll90 0.3488** 0.5369 0.2932 0.4044 1.15
foreignborn 0.1376** 0.2153 0.0739 0.2013 1.56
mfge8697pc -0.0389** -0.1641 -0.0581 -0.0196 1.03
techpole90 0.0028* 0.1113 0.0002 0.0054 1.62
unionrep90 -0.001** -0.1596 -0.0016 -0.0004 1.34
mw -0.011** -0.1695 -0.0171 -0.0049 1.40
nmsa30 -0.0053 -0.0559 -0.0138 0.0032 1.27
pop90tt 0.0057* 0.1532 0.0018 0.0096 1.71
constant 0.3194** 0.2857 0.3531
Sample Size 264
F-value 44.02**
R2 0.5800
Adjusted R2 0.5668
p<.05=*  p<.01=**
95% Confidence 
Interval
Table 1: Model 1 Economic Counter-Argument Variables
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than the skill-biased technical change variable, and the minimum wage variable is larger 
than the effects of international trade.  This finding suggests that institutional factors are 
as important as the competitive factors, as DiNardo, Fontin, and Lemieux (1996) and 
Card (2001) have found (among others).  The findings may also suggest that the role of 
labor market norms—which govern socially “acceptable” employment arrangements and 
are often informally set by these institutions—may be a critical factor in reducing 
inequality (Osterman, 1999). 
 
International trade, represented by the change in manufacturing earnings variable 
mfge8697pc, was negative as expected.  International trade was the fourth largest factor 
in determining regional variances in inequality besides the control variables—its 
standardized coefficient was -0.16.  As neither a strong nor weak predictor of inequality, 
trade’s middle-of-the-road performance reflects a position held neither by trade 
proponents or dissenters (see Wood, 1995 or Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997).  Instead, 
trade falls someplace in between the two views, reflecting the views of Cline (2001).  In 
terms of policy, the finding suggests that protectionist policies would have limited 
benefits for inequality.    
 
As expected, skill-biased technical change, as represented by the variable TechPole, has a 
positive coefficient.  This is consistent with the majority of the research, which suggests 
that skill-biased technical change has been a cause of inequality.  With a standardized 
coefficient of 0.11, however, trade is the smallest predictor of inequality—behind the 
control variable population.  This is not consistent with the literature, which suggests that 
skill-biased technical change has been one of the leading factors—if not the largest 
factor.  This could be due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the TechPole variable 
is not a perfect representation of skills-bias.  But TechPole’s lack of sizeable influence 
could also indicate that skills-bias is more of a factor in time series analysis than in cross-
sectional analysis.   
 
Model 2 includes the creative class variable (cc98), and the three control variables (full 
results are shown in Table 2).  The model is significant, with an F-value of 58.66.  Given 
that the model has only four variables (three of which are control variables), the adjusted 
R2 is surprisingly high at 0.47, meaning that the model explains almost fifty percent of 
the dependent variable’s change.  Though the adjusted R2 for Model 2 is lower than the 
adjusted R2 in Model 2, the Model is a better model, as determined by the Bayesian 
Information Criterion Test (BIC Test).  Rather than determining explanatory power, 
however, this could be a reflection of model specification: the traditional model (Model 
1) contains eight independent variables, while Florida’s model (Model 2) contains just 
four variables, and the BIC Test penalized heavily for over-specified models.   
 
The creative class variable in Model 2 is significant, and has a standardized coefficient of 
0.52, the largest in the model.  This is a very large standardized coefficient, regardless of 
the fact that the model has only one explanatory variable.  Two of the control variables—
the bohemian index and population—are also significant.  The model suggests that 
Florida may, in fact, have a credible theory—the creative class could, in fact, be the 
largest predictor of regional inequality.   
20 
 
 
Model 3 combines the variables from Model 1 and Model 2 (full results are shown in 
Table 3).  Like Models 1 and 2, the model is significant, and has an F-value of 44.89.  
The model has the highest adjusted R2 of the three models, explaining over sixty percent 
of the variation with a value of 0.63.  This suggests that the model explains more 
dependent variable variation than either Model 1 or 2.  F-tests for model comparison, 
with null hypotheses that Model 3 is equal to Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, are 
each rejected with p-values of 0.000, meaning that Model 3 is a significantly better model 
at explaining the variation in the dependent variable.   
 
As in Models 1, college-educated adults remain the primary indicator of inequality, with 
a standardized coefficient of 0.35.  The creative class variable is the second largest 
predictor, with a standardized coefficient of 0.32. However, we fail to reject an F-test on 
college-educated adults and the creative class, where the null hypothesis is that the two 
variables are equal.  This suggests that the creative class variable may not necessarily add 
to our understanding of inequality, and could reflect the criticisms of Florida’s detractors, 
Variables Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficient
VIF
coll90 0.225** 0.3463 0.1543 0.2957 2.14
foreignborn 0.1467** 0.2296 0.0874 0.2061 1.56
mfge8697pc -0.0285** -0.1203 -0.0467 -0.0103 1.07
techpole90 0.0021 0.0840 -0.0003 0.0045 1.63
unionrep90 -0.001** -0.1581 -0.0015 -0.0005 1.35
mw -0.0099** -0.1531 -0.0156 -0.0042 1.40
cc98 0.3018** 0.3235 0.2093 0.3943 1.78
bohoidx90 0.0039 0.0337 -0.0074 0.0151 1.75
nmsa30 -0.0057 -0.0608 -0.0136 0.0022 1.27
pop90tt 0.0027 0.0740 -0.0011 0.0066 1.90
constant 0.2546** 0.2176 0.2917
Sample Size 264
F-value 44.89
R2 0.6396
Adjusted R2 0.6253
p<.05=*  p<.01=**
Table 3: Model 3 Florida's and Economic Counter-Argument Variables
95% Confidence 
Interval
Variables Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficient
VIF
cc98 0.4808** 0.5154 9.9900 0.0000 1.31
bohoidx90 0.0209** 0.1827 3.5200 0.0010 1.33
nmsa30 -0.0028 -0.0302 -0.6700 0.5040 1.00
pop90tt 0.0053* 0.1419 2.7900 0.0060 1.28
constant 0.1706** 13.1600 0.0000
Sample Size 264
F-value 58.66**
R2 0.4753
Adjusted R2 0.4672
p<.05=*  p<.01=**
Table 2: Model 2 Florida's Variables
95% Confidence 
Interval
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who suggest that the creative class is nothing more than a fancy name for college-
educated adults (Baris, 2003; Peck, 2005). 
 
Two key changes between Models 1 and 2, and Model 3, stand out.  The first is that 
TechPole is no longer significant.  Since it was the weakest predictor of inequality in 
Model 1 and was barely significant, this is not entirely surprising, especially given the 
shortcomings of the variable.  Yet it may suggest that, as previously mentioned, skill-
biased technical change is not a determinant in the regional variation of inequality.  The 
second is that international trade is the least important explanatory variable, dropping 
below unionization.  
 
Taken together, the results indicate that Florida’s creative class is a positive, significant 
indicator of inequality, though it is not the only one; indeed, the role of the creative class 
cannot be statistically distinguished from the role of the share of college-educated adults 
in predicting inequality in a region.  But it is clear that it is not simply a division of labor 
that causes inequality; a decline in manufacturing was a significant predictor of 
inequality, and immigration appears to have strong role in local inequality.  Furthermore, 
Florida’s acceptance of inequality as unavoidable is not reflected in the models, given the 
strong performance of “old-fashioned” institutional variables such as the minimum wage 
and unionization.   
 
SECTION VII 
COMBATTING INEQUALITY THROUGH POLICY 
 
The results from the models suggest that policymakers and activists in regions following 
a creative class strategy can and should take steps to ensure that the inequality associated 
with Florida’s creative class is kept at bay. As cities adopt ever-popular creative class 
strategies, and blindly pursue high-tech companies and hip eateries, the adverse 
consequence of inequality must be considered.  Local policymakers must remove their 
blinders and confront the “externality” of inequality head on. 
 
The results from the regression model presented in this paper point to several paths that 
policymakers or activists can follow in an effort to reduce inequality. In the remaining 
sections of this paper, I will focus on three that I see as the most important.  The first is to 
push for higher statewide minimum wages, through coalitions built around local living 
wage campaigns.  The second is to support unionization strategies among the service 
industry, through training and outreach assistance.  The third is to work with immigrant 
“work centers” towards the goal of integrating immigrants into local labor market 
institutions.17   
 
                                                 
17
 The somewhat weak performance of manufacturing suggests that the large incentive packages often 
offered to manufacturing companies may not have much impact on a region’s inequality; I suggest that, 
when weighing incentive packages, localities seriously consider the wages these companies will offer, and 
whether they will help reduce inequality. Additionally, the insignificance of skill-biased technical change 
could indicate that the tide of technical change is one that is not worth fighting at the regional level, and 
that policy attention should be addressed elsewhere; more research should be conducted here. 
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Absent from this list is the suggestion to focus narrowly on higher education and more 
specifically, the attainment of college degrees by members of disadvantaged socio-
economic groups. This omission is deliberate on my part, as human capital-focused 
solutions, in and of themselves, fail to address stagnating wages of many college-degree 
holders leading to the growing variance in income earned by college-educated adults 
(within-group inequality), as well as the growing underemployment of college educated 
youth in this country (Gottschalk, 1997; Livingstone, 1997).  
 
Labor analysts have started to examine employment and wage trends more carefully in an 
effort to understand the limits of education-focused solutions. One hypothesis is that low-
wage employers are requiring college credentials from workers to fill even the most basic 
of jobs. This suggests that the college-educated are working in an increasingly large share 
of the jobs in a metropolitan area, including jobs traditionally held by non-college-
educated adults (Livingstone, 1997).  This trend has two results that help to explain the 
relationship between the growing share of college-educated adults and urban inequality. 
 
First, for less-educated workers, this “professionalization” of low-wage work results in 
even fewer employment opportunities.  Furthermore, the employment opportunities that 
do exist are at now pushed down to the very lowest rung of the occupational ladder—this 
is because the jobs formerly reserved for less-educated workers are now reserved for 
educated workers with a college degree.  This means that less-educated and less-skilled 
workers are competing for a smaller number of jobs, which in turn puts downward 
pressure on the wages at the bottom of the skill and educational distribution.   
 
While this could suggest the need to promote college education and upskilling, this policy 
suggestion ignores a second emerging trend: underemployment of college-educated 
workers (Livingstone, 1997).  Underemployment occurs when an employer requires a 
college degree for a job, yet the skills the worker acquired in college are never used in the 
job.18  Underemployment could help explain the growing within-group inequality, where 
the wages of the college-educated are seeing ever larger variances since college-educated 
workers now occupy the top end of the “less-skilled” job distribution.     
 
Finally, human capital-driven solutions, in and of themselves, ignore another very real 
danger: the potentially never-ending ratcheting up of educational requirements.  That is, 
whereas in the past a worker needed an undergraduate degree for a specific job and in the 
even further past a worker needed only a high-school degree for that same job, in the 
future a worker may need a masters degree to work in the same occupation.  
 
This could have severe implications for the question of who is getting a degree, and who 
is benefiting from the growing professionalization of work.  Underemployment, within-
group inequality, and the ratcheting-up of educational requirements may in turn result in 
fewer college-degrees for disadvantaged, low-income youth. This is because the costs of 
                                                 
18
 Both the professionalization and underemployment trends could be explained by the signaling argument, 
where employers do not necessarily want the skills that the employee possesses, but rather accept the 
college degree as a “signal” of intelligence or ability; those without the signal are largely assumed to not 
have this intelligence or ability. 
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education may outweigh their uncertain benefits (due to the increasing variance in skilled 
earnings).  More research is clearly needed to fully understand the complex relationship 
between human capital investments and rising metropolitan inequality. Case-studies and 
case comparisons are also needed to understand the conditions under which education 
and retraining initiatives lead to improved earnings and quality job opportunities. 
Existing studies of this type often point to the need for combined or nested institutional 
supports—that is the strategic partnering of pro-labor and pro-education initiatives 
(Osterman, 1999; Lautch and Osterman, 1988; Howell, 1994, 2000). The remaining 
sections of this paper provide some insights into what these nested supports might look 
like. 
 
Policy: Higher State Minimum Wages and well-structured “Living Wages” 
 
As a start, the findings on minimum wages—that states with higher minimum wages have 
lower levels of inequality—suggest that regions should try and set higher state minimum 
wages. Unfortunately, outside of pushing state representatives for higher minimum 
wages, this leaves local actors with few policy avenues to pursue in this are.  
Furthermore, increasing the state minimum wage could be politically difficult, and could 
therefore be more of a long-term goal.   
 
A living wage campaign may represent an alternative policy route, one that as we shall 
see is complementary to pushing for higher state minimum wages.  A living wage is a 
wage rate, established by local legislation, which is set above the prevailing minimum 
wage in an area.  Living wages differ from state minimum wages in that state minimum 
wages typically apply to all companies, whereas local living wages are usually limited to 
either government contractors, businesses seeking public assistance, and/or social service 
providers.  Relative to either state or federal minimum wages, therefore, living wages 
reach far fewer low-wage workers; Brenner estimates that living wages reach less than 
one percent of workers in cities that have implemented them (Brenner, 2004).  This 
makes living wage campaigns a bit of “paradox”: living wage ordinances are easy to pass 
because they are limited in scope, but the tradeoff is that not many workers are covered 
by them (Bernstein, 2005).    
 
To date, very few robust statistical studies have been conducted on the effects of living 
wages on raising the economic position of low-wage workers, in part because national 
data sets have limitations that preclude their use in living wage models.19  However, case 
studies of living wages point to several key findings that are applicable to this study of 
inequality: 
 
- Contrary to what conservative economists would predict, living wage laws have 
had relatively few adverse effects on employment; in fact, employment levels in 
some cases increased after the implementation of living wages (Brenner, 2004).   
                                                 
19
 See Bernstein (2005) and Brenner (2004) for discussion about these methodological constraints.   
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- Firm relocation in reaction to mandated higher wages is not a significant problem 
for living wages, since living wages are tied not the location of the business but to 
the location of the services provided (Brenner, 2004).   
- The higher wages have not led to noticeable decreases in bids for city contracts; in 
some instances, bids have risen (Brenner, 2004). 
 
These findings show that the passage of a living wage does not lead to doomsday 
scenarios of layoffs, firm flights, and unfilled city contracts that opponents often point to.   
 
Two aspects of the living wage are critical in the development of a local minimum wage 
that can successfully meet the goal of reducing inequality.  The first is the structure of the 
living wage legislation.  The structure of the legislation determines both the scale of the 
coverage and the enforcement for violators.  The second is the makeup and involvement 
of the coalition that pushes for the living wage.  This is critical to: the success of the 
ordinance’s passage; the ability to withstand intense anti-living wage pressure; the 
success of compliance and enforcement; and the likelihood of any possible future 
expansion in coverage.  
 
Legislation 
In terms of legislation, the broader the legislation is (in terms of affected sectors), the 
better the living wage will be at improving the lot of low-wage workers, thereby reducing 
inequality.  City or County governments are often large and disjointed, and ensuring that 
workers in all of these divisions (both City employees and, for example, Parks and 
Recreation Department employees) are covered is essential, not only because it will 
ensure that as many workers as possible are covered, but because it will limit the amount 
of cross-departmental “shifting” that can occur in order to avoid the living wage.  
 
Yet the living wage will never reach these workers if the municipality does not enforce it, 
making enforcement a critical piece of the legislation.  The legislation must include 
budgets for city oversight, and clear punishments for companies who do not follow the 
living wage (Luce, 2005).  Successful living wage legislation should also include 
provisions for educating workers about their rights under the new living wage law, and 
protections for whistleblowers who report companies that are not paying the living wage, 
so that workers who are getting paid below the wage are willing and able to report the 
violation. (Zabin and Martin, 1999).   
 
Ultimately, the level of community involvement will determine the pressure and 
oversight placed on local government.   
 
Coalition 
The coalition that works towards legislation is critical in determining its ultimate success, 
since a living wage that has been developed with input from a broad-based, strong 
coalition is more likely to have a broader scope, and is more likely to include legislation 
for enforcement (Luce, 2005).  Ideally, a living wage campaign coalition would involve 
the participation of labor, religious, community, and political groups (Bernstein, 2005; 
Zabin and Martin, 1999).  This broad coalition would be able to achieve a hegemonic 
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“critical mass” against the typical anti-living wage groups (usually business associations), 
and would be better able to rally the support of voters or officials to pass the living wage 
legislation.    
 
Yet the benefits of having a broad-based coalition are not limited to the passage of the 
initial living wage legislation. In writing about the declining power of union, Michael 
Piore writes that modern workers identify not as members of a particular working group 
or class, but as part of a demographic group (Piore 2002).  This has been a key feature in 
declining worker solidarity.  By including a diverse set of organizations in the living 
wage coalitions, the coalitions can effectively reach across lines of demographic self-
identification without having to dismantle them.  Their strength comes not from forcing 
workers and citizens to see themselves as homogeneous workers (a strategy that may or 
may not work), but from helping workers and citizens from a variety of backgrounds to 
see that they can work as one. 
 
A good example of how living wage campaigns have the potential to flow upwards from 
the local level to exact state-level change is in Michigan, which recently passed a 
statewide minimum wage that will reach $7.40 an hour by 2008.  Michigan has some of 
the oldest living wage laws in the country, beginning in cities and gradually expanding to 
counties.  Though the Republican state legislature was opposed to increasing the state 
minimum wage above the federal level, they did so after a petition drive to put the 
minimum wage on the November ballot had collected over 150,000 signatures in the 
state, and appeared likely to succeed come November (ACORN, 2006).   
 
The successful petition drive to put the issue on the ballot was led by the Association for 
Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN),20 the Michigan Democratic Party, 
labor organizations, community, and faith-based organizations.  An economic justice 
organization was also instrumental in the campaign; living wages are fast becoming 
contested terrain, and increasingly require legal assistance to both write laws and hold off 
anti-living wage legal assaults (ACORN, 2006).  To my knowledge, no formal case study 
of Michigan’s recent successful effort to increase the minimum wage exists; the strategies 
used in Michigan and similar states around the country (from Arkansas to Maine) are 
clearly areas that need further research.  However, it appears that the momentum built 
over the last eight years through local coalitions and living wage victories was 
instrumental in leading to the increase in the minimum wage, providing a clear example 
of the power of local action. 
 
To some, implementing a living wage may seem like a small step in reducing inequality 
since it reaches so few workers; San Jose California currently has one of the highest 
living wages, but occupies the highest position on Florida’s inequality index, showing all 
too clearly that living wages are not a panacea.  Yet as the Michigan example shows, the 
passage of a living wage from a grassroots coalition is more than just the living wage: it 
is a step towards forming coalitions that can work towards larger, state-wide goals.  
                                                 
20
 ACORN is an international group of community organizations that is at the forefront of 
living wage movements.   
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In addition to focusing on increasing state (or even federal) minimum wages, successful 
coalitions can turn their attention to the future by focusing on expanding the local living 
wage to more sectors.  In doing so, they can direct their attention to workplaces or sectors 
that are strategic targets for unionization (Zabin and Martin, 1999), key in our second 
policy. And the living wage coalitions can be critical in uniting immigrants with non-
immigrant groups, critical for our third policy.  The passage of local living wages, in 
conjunction with labor and immigrant movements, may ultimately lead to large-scale 
reductions in local inequality. 
 
Policy: Unionization among the Service Industry 
 
The results from the regression model indicate the unionization is successful at limiting 
inequality, suggesting that a second inequality-reducing policy area would be to push for 
unionization among the “armies or service workers” supporting the creative classes.  
Though unions have traditionally been associated with the manufacturing sector, the 
fastest growing unions are in the service sector, where wages are low and benefits rare—
but where employment growth is expected to be high in the future.  This expected growth 
could be especially high in creative cities, where, as a Silicon Valley commentator told 
the New York Times: “‘[b]ehind every software engineer is a nanny or a food-service 
worker.’”(Stolarick, 2003; Florida, 2003).  Ensuring that these nannies and food-service 
workers are paid wages and benefits that can support their households is critical to 
ensuring an equitable city, and unions may be one way to do this. 
 
Yet unionization is often seen as something outside the arena of policymakers—indeed, 
unionization is seen as being outside the arena of policy in general, and instead in the 
arena of politics, making policies directly aimed at promoting unionization a bit of an 
anathema to policymakers who are trying to remain neutral.  But given the strong 
performance of unions in limiting inequality, this is not an acceptable position to take; in 
the interest of reducing inequality, local actors—even if they are not actively encouraging 
unionization—must ensure that unions are at least given an equal playing field with 
employers.  To ensure this, policymakers can follow three areas: including union-friendly 
policies in living wage campaigns, bringing unions and businesses together and helping 
them realize their joint benefits, and bringing unions together with immigrant working 
centers (the latter will be addressed in the next section). 
 
Unionization through Living Wage Legislation 
Legislation that is conducive to unionization should be included in living wage 
legislation.  The first area of legislation would ensure that local governments do not 
contract out employment in order to avoid paying living wages by including “worker 
retention” legislation, which limits the ability to contract out labor to avoid the living 
wage.  While this would obviously strengthen the living wage coverage, it would also 
ensure that unionized government jobs are not subcontracted to nonunionized, low-wage 
firms.  The second area of legislation would be to include “labor peace” ordinances, 
which mandate that employers must remain neutral during unionization votes.  This 
would ensure that employers not harass workers who are trying to unionize, or make 
27 
unionization difficult in other ways.  Alone, each of these ordinances would be difficult 
to pass, yet they can successfully integrated into living wage legislation (Zabin and 
Martin, 1999).   
 
Joint Benefits 
The adversarial conditions in which unions and businesses often act are not mutually 
beneficial.  While unions are often seen as simply demanding higher wages and benefits, 
they also have positive business aspects: they can help in training new and old workers, 
can operate effective screening processes for new workers, they can reduce turnover, and 
can ensure that patrons will be treated with care by a work crew with professional 
standards (Shaiken, 2004; Rothman, 2003; Waddoups, 2002).  
 
In creative cities, where the creative class is spending their dollars in gourmet eateries 
and hip coffee shops, service and ambiance are key to attracting this fickle class.  In 
another market where service and ambiance are key—Las Vegas—management in the 
hotel and gaming industry has formed a partnership with the unions.  Since the quality of 
service separates the successful, profitable properties from those that are not, the major 
hotels and casinos in Las Vegas realized that their business depends on the benefits that 
unions can provide (Rothman, 2003).   
 
Together, the unions and hotels created centers where both potential and existing 
employees can receive the training that makes them superior workers, able to provide 
superior service to hotel guests: current employees can improve and increase their skills, 
and the hotels can screen potential future employees as they are learning (Waddoups, 
2001, 2002).  The unions in Las Vegas cut down on hiring and training costs, and reduce 
turnover—making them cost effective, even with the higher wages and benefits 
(Rothman, 2003).  
 
Perhaps most importantly in terms of inequality, the unions in Las Vegas played a 
“significant role” in keeping the hotel-casino workers above poverty wages, allowing 
them to function as middle-class members of society (Waddoups, 2001; Rothman, 2003). 
Without the unions, the training that allows the workers to be high-skilled and high-wage 
may not occur; in competitive environments like the Las Vegas gambling industry, hotels 
are unlikely to provide training to their workers for fear of “poaching” from other hotels.  
Thus without the unions, Las Vegas could be recognized not as a city with middle-class, 
high-skilled workers but as a city with poor, low-skilled workers.   
 
While Las Vegas may seem like another world (and indeed is considered “uncreative” by 
Florida), unionization has also been successful in the most creative place—Silicon 
Valley.  In the 1980s, the “Justice for Janitors” movement organized a largely immigrant 
subcontracting workforce, and in the early 1990s pushed Apple Computer into replacing 
its nonunion subcontracted janitors with union janitors, largely to “avoid damage to their 
public image” (Zlolniski, 1994).  This gets at the interesting question proposed by Baris 
in her review of the Rise of the Creative Class: how can successful, creative regions draw 
on their creative base to “pressure firms into providing better wages and benefits for low-
end service workers, therefore creating a potential path from creative economy success to 
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overall reduction of poverty” (Baris, 2003).  With their focus on image and service, 
pressure on creative companies to hire union contractors or follow the norms set by 
unions could be successful.  Companies like Whole Foods or CostCo do not pay higher 
wages or work with unions because of a deep empathy for their employees; they do it 
because it is good for business. 
 
Policy: Integrate Immigrants into Community Groups, Educational Programs 
 
Immigration emerged from the results as the third most important variable in determining 
inequality in a region.  While some may interpret this result as a call to expel immigrants 
from the country, this would be misguided; it is the structure of the economy, with its 
emphasis on low-cost subcontracting under few enforced labor laws, which pulls 
immigrants into the economy.  The answer then is not the expel immigrants, but to 
further pull them into the American economy through strengthened labor market 
institutions.  
 
Immigrants, however, can be tricky to involve in formal labor market institutions, 
especially if they are undocumented.  Yet it is not impossible.  Janice Fine has 
documented the emergence of a new form of immigrant labor market institution: the 
worker center, which is a “community-based mediating institution that provide[s] support 
to low-wage workers,” and where “…advocacy and organizing activities the priority.” 
(Fine, 2006).  Though originally formed by blacks in the American South to combat 
institutionalized racism, worker centers are now more identified with immigrant labor, 
which now constitutes almost eighty percent of worker center organizations.   
 
Yet very few immigrant work centers have strong, ongoing relationships with unions.  Of 
the working centers researched by Fine, only 15 percent had a strong, working 
relationship with unions.  A whopping 82 percent had “occasional partnerships,” while 3 
percent had no partnerships with unions (Fine, 2006).  Fine relates that immigrant work 
centers complained of having workplaces that wanted to organize, but that they couldn’t 
find a union to help them do so (Fine, 2006).  And when they did work together, they 
were not always successful at unionizing a firm—or of even getting to that late stage in 
the unionization process. 
 
The lack of interaction between unions and immigrant work center is a serious concern.  
Yet the lack of coordination is not entirely surprising.  Unions and immigrants have had a 
volatile past; unions have traditionally viewed immigrants as a threat to unions (since 
immigrants often work in the same sectors as unionized workers, though through 
informal arrangements and for very low wages), even though in the long-term immigrants 
could grow the ranks of union members (Briggs, 1998).  This tension between the short-
term and the long-term roles of immigrants has led to strains between immigrant groups 
and unions.   
 
By not working with immigrant centers, however, unions may be limiting their long-term 
ability to protect the economic well being of the less-educated and less-skilled American 
worker.  In an era when union membership is declining, this is a troubling sign of unions 
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still not being able to effectively work with immigrants—though again not entirely 
surprising.  Fine relates that there is a “dramatic culture clash” that occurs between 
unions and immigrant activists at the worker centers.  Immigrants at work centers claim 
that unions are “top-down, undemocratic, and disconnected from the community”; unions 
claim that the immigrants are unfamiliar with unionization laws, and are unrealistic about 
the time and efforts that are required to win a union drive (Fine, 2006).  However, if the 
immigrant worker centers and labor organizations are involved as part of a broader 
coalition in a living wage campaign, these cultural “clashes” could be avoided: the living 
wage campaign could act as a “getting to know you” period, where the unions and 
immigrant work centers could learn each others norms and cultures.   
 
There are working models that show how success can be accomplished.  In Lowell, 
Massachussetts, the community group Coalition for a Better Acre (CBA), comprised of 
immigrants and minorities from one of Lowell’s poorest and oldest immigrant 
neighborhoods (the Acre, with a poverty rate of over forty percent), acted in conjunction 
with local unions, the University of Massachusetts-Lowell (UMASS-Lowell), the 
Cambodian Mutual Assistance Association, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to integrate their residents into Lowell’s redevelopment process of local 
brownfields.  This is no small task; Lowell, the birthplace of America’s textile industry, 
has one of the highest concentrations of brownfields in the United States, and most of 
these brownfields are in poor ethnic and minority communities.   
 
One of the first and most ambitious steps in Lowell’s redevelopment was the construction 
of both a ballpark and a hockey arena to house the city’s minor league baseball and 
hockey teams (among other projects, including new housing and grocery stores on 
brownfields in the low-income neighborhoods).  But rather than simply hire outside 
contractors or rely on cheap, unskilled labor in the redevelopment, the CBA and the EPA 
worked together with local Boston unions and UMASS-Lowell to train Acre residents in 
high-paying, high-skill environmental testing and construction jobs. Workers in the 
program were placed in apprenticeship programs with the local union, ensuring that they 
would have a good chance of long-term union jobs after the program’s completion.  In 
the end, Lowell’s program brought good-quality jobs to some of Lowell’s poorest 
residents, and integrated a long-standing immigrant community into the city 
redevelopment process (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2002; National 
Institute of Environmental Health Services, 2000).   
 
In terms of policy solutions, it is important to note that the local government in Lowell 
acted as the facilitator between the union and immigrant workers, brining the two 
together with EPA funding.  In fact, the City of Lowell mandates that thirty percent of 
workers on brownfield remediation sites be local, further emphasizing their leading role 
in ensuring local economic development from redevelopment strategies (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2002).  And just like how in Las Vegas the hotels and 
unions saw the joint benefits of working together, in Lowell the city saw long-term 
economic development in the immigrant neighborhoods, the unions saw future well-
trained members, and the immigrants were integrated into the unions and city 
development process ensuring them better economic opportunities.  
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The Lowell case is underscored by the fact that the city has been following a creative 
class strategy, actively luring artists and bohemians away from overpriced lofts and 
apartments in Cambridge and Boston to lofts, apartments, restaurants, galleries, and 
shops that fill the renovated mills along the canals and river (City of Lowell, 2006; 
Galvin, 2006).  Indeed, it is the creative class strategy that has led Lowell to clean up its 
brownfields and redevelop its mills (Galvin, 2006).  Clearly, creative redevelopment can 
work with both unions and immigrant communities and achieve joint benefits for all, and 
there is a way to have “creative class trickle down” with the active leadership of 
community, immigrant, and labor organizations. 
 
SECTION VIII: CONCLUSION 
 
This paper set out to answer three questions.  First, is the creative class the sole predictor 
of inequality in metropolitan areas, or do factors and theories that frequently crop up in 
economic journals (such a skill-biased technical change, immigration, etc) better predict 
inequality? Second, is there a role for well-established labor market institutions to play in 
reducing inequality the creative economy?  And third, based on the regression results and 
literature, what policies can local metropolitan areas undertake to lessen the impacts of 
inequality?  
 
The regression models in this paper suggest that the creative class is not the sole predictor 
of inequality.  Yet even though it is statistically indistinguishable from the share of 
college-educated adults in a metropolitan area, it is a strong and significant predictor of 
inequality.  The results therefore seem to indicate that Florida is at least partially correct: 
inequality, it seems, does in fact go hand in hand with being a creative city.   
 
This does not mean that we should be praising Florida for uncovering great insights into 
urban studies.  Earlier insight by writers like Sassen, and the results from the models, 
suggests that there are deeper causes of inequality more endemic to our economy.  The 
economic restructuring in cities—characterized by a declining manufacturing sector, 
weak labor market institutions, and a never-ending supply of immigrant labor—has 
allowed highly-paid professionals to live in a paradise of low-wage labor.  Though the 
models in this paper cannot pinpoint this with certainty, it could be that the creative class 
has a spurious relationship with inequality: it is the economic restructuring that causes 
both the creative class and inequality, and not the creative class, absent of restructuring, 
causing inequality.  
 
Yet the models and research suggest that there are viable policy solutions that cities 
following creative class strategies can adopt in order to limit inequality.  The strong 
performance of higher state minimum wages and unions suggest that they are still 
relevant in today’s economy; they are not the outdated, irrelevant institutions that Florida 
makes them out to be.  And the performance of immigration does not necessarily point to 
the need for draconian immigration reforms; rather, it points to the need to incorporate 
immigrant communities into the larger labor market institutions, such as unions and 
living and minimum wage campaigns.   
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Whether academics approve or not, the creative class strategies are here to stay.  Yet the 
striking overlap between being a creative city and being an unequal city is troubling not 
only in terms of ethical and political concerns, but also because if could have severe 
implications for the long-term sustainability of the economy.   This all begs the question: 
is it possible to both reduce inequality and become a creative center?  The answer, I 
propose, is yes: inequality is not an “externality,” an unavoidable offshoot of the creative 
economy, as Florida says.  Rather, inequality is the result of the underlying structure of 
the economy.  Nor do the solutions to inequality lie within the creative class itself; telling 
the noncreative classes to follow a twisting, winner-takes-all path to creativity achieves 
little, if anything.  Rather, broad-based coalitions comprised of faith-based, immigrant, 
labor, and political groups (in other words, groups comprised of both the creative and 
noncreative classes) must work together and push for local living wages, unionization, 
and the integration of immigrant groups.  
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Class Occupations
Creative Class
     Super-Creative Core Computer and mathematical occupations
Architecture and engineering occupations
Life, physical, and social science occupations
Education, training, and library occupations
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
     Creative Professionals Management occupations
Business and financial operations occupations
Legal occupations
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations
High-end sales and sales management
Working Class Construction and extraction occupations
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
Production occupations
Transportation and material moving occupations
Service Class Health care support occupations
Food preparation and food-service-related occupations
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations
Personal care and service occupations
Low-end sales and related occupations
Office and administrative support occupations
Community and social services occupations
Protective service occupations
Appendix A: Richard Florida's Classes, by Occupation
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Factor Measure Symbol Description
Earnings Inequality Inequality Index wi04
A ratio comparing creative to noncreative earnings in an MSA, 
using the Theil-T index.  The indec is the sum of: the natural log of 
the ratio of the average earnings of each class to the average 
earnings of the MSA, multiplied by the proportion of the population 
that the class represents.
Technology or Management 
Inducement College Educated Adults coll90
Percent of population aged 25 and older with at least a bachelor's 
degree in the MSA, 1990
Immigration Foreign Born Presence foreignborn Percent of the population that is foreign born, 1990
International Trade Manufacturing Sector mfge8697pc Percent change in MSA earnings from manufacturing, 1986-1997
Skill-biased Technical Change Technology in an Economy TechPole90
Combination of: MSA's high-tech industrial output as a percentage 
of total US high-tech industrial output; and the MSA's location 
quotient of high-tech industrial output, 1990
Unionization Union Representation unionrep90
Percent of the workforce in the state that is represented by a union, 
1990
Minimum Wage State Minimum Wages mw State minimum wage, 2003 (check)
Creative Division of Labor Creative Class cc98
Percent of MSA workforce in super-creative core and creative 
professional occupations, 1998
Controls Bohemian Index bohoidx90 Location quotient for artistically creative people in MSA, 1990
Population pop90tt Population of the MSA in 1990, in thousands
Number of MSAs nmsa30 Inclusive number of MSAs within 30 miles of target MSA
Thanks to Richard Florida and Kevin Stolarick for sharing their data for research purposes
Appendix B: Variables, Descriptions, and Sources
Census
Census
Richard Florida: BLS
Richard Florida: BLS
Richard Florida; Milken
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census = US Census Bureau, BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis, Milken = Milken Institute
Source
Census
Census
BLS
BLS, Individual States
BEA
Richard Florida; BLS
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Variables Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Hypothesized 
Direction
wi04 264 0.3220 0.0427 0.2090 0.4570 NA
coll90 264 0.1941 0.0658 0.0077 0.4214 Positive
foreignborn 264 0.0645 0.0669 0.0065 0.4849 Positive
mfge8697pc 264 -0.1112 0.1803 -0.6760 0.5815 Negative
techpole90 264 0.4949 1.6996 0 20.17 Positive
mw 264 5.4633 0.6591 5.15 7.4 Negative
unionrep90 264 17.2364 6.7451 6.1 30.6 Negative
cc98 264 0.2743 0.0458 0.1503 0.4092 Positive
bohoidx90 264 0.9161 0.3737 0.23 2.9 Positive
pop90tt 264 0.7097 1.1503 0.0731 8.8782 NA
nmsa30 264 1.1629 0.4531 1 4 NA
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
